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Tarski’s classical relevant logic
Roger D. Maddux
Abstract Tarski’s classical relevant logic TR arises from his work on the
foundations of the calculus of relations and on first-order logic restricted to
finitely many variables. The theorems of TR are defined here as the formu-
las whose translations into first-order logic of binary relations can be proved
using no more than four variables from the assumptions that all the rela-
tions are dense and commute under composition. Its rules are determined
similarly. The vocabulary of TR is the same as the classical relevant logic
CR∗ proposed by Meyer and Routley [28, 29]. TR properly contains CR∗,
since the class of model structures characteristic for TR is the class of those
CR∗-model structures that satisfy Dunn’s frame condition called “tagging”.
There is a formula in TR \ CR∗ that corresponds to tagging and provides
a counterexample to a theorem of Kowalski. The class of model structures
characteristic for TR is the class of atom structures of atomic commutative
dense relation algebras. An equation is true in every commutative dense re-
lation algebra if and only if it can be established by a proof in first order
logic restricted to four variables that the equation is true when formulas are
interpreted as relations.
1 Introduction
In 1975, Alfred Tarski delivered a pair of lectures on relation algebras at the
University of Campinas. At the end of his second lecture, Tarski said,
“And finally, the last question, if it is so, you could ask me a question whether
this definition of relation algebra which I have suggested and which I have founded
— I suggested it many years ago — is justified in any intrinsic sense. If we know
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that these are not all equations which are needed to obtain representation theorems,
this means, to obtain the algebraic expression of first-order logic with two-place
predicate, if we know that this is not an adequate expression of this logic, then why
restrict oneself to these equations? Why not to add strictly some other equations
which hold in representable relation algebras or maybe all?”
The answer is that Tarski’s definition of relation algebras axiomatizes the
equations provable with 4 variables (Theorem 5 in §9). Since Tarski was ax-
iomatizing the calculus of relations, he had to choose axioms that are true
under the formulas-as-relations interpretation in which variables denote
binary relations and operation symbols denote operations on relations. Since
Meyer and Routley use the same operations as relation algebras, the formulas-
as-relations interpretation can be applied to their classical relevant logicCR∗,
as is done in Table 1. The formulas-as-relations interpretation generalizes the
formulas-as-classes interpretation, but reduces to it when the base set U has
only one element. Interpreting formulas as binary relations on a one-element
set leads to classical propositional calculus. A formula A is valid (under the
formulas-as-relations interpretation) if A denotes a relation containing the
identity relation t whenever its variables are mapped to relations. Every for-
disjunction A ∨ B = {〈x, y〉 : 〈x, y〉 ∈ A or 〈x, y〉 ∈ B}
conjunction A ∧ B = {〈x, y〉 : 〈x, y〉 ∈ A and 〈x, y〉 ∈ B}
Boolean negation ¬A = {〈x, y〉 : x, y ∈ U and 〈x, y〉 /∈ A}
De Morgan negation ∼A = {〈x, y〉 : x, y ∈ U and 〈y, x〉 /∈ A}
implication A→ B = {〈x, y〉 : x, y ∈ U , and for all z ∈ U ,
if 〈z, x〉 ∈ A then 〈z, y〉 ∈ B}
fusion A ◦B = {〈x, y〉 : for some z, 〈z, y〉 ∈ A and 〈x, z〉 ∈ B}
Routley star A∗ = {〈x, y〉 : 〈y, x〉 ∈ A}
truth t = {〈x, x〉 : x ∈ U}
Table 1 Operations for interpreting formulas as relations on a base set U
mula inCR∗ is valid if the variables are restricted to range over a collection of
dense relations that commute under fusion. More generally, if A ∈ CR∗ then
t ≤ A is true in every commutative dense relation algebra. The converse fails
since, as Dunn [6] pointed out, the atom structures of relation algebras satisfy
the frame condition Rabc⇒ Rb∗a∗c∗, called “tagging”, which corresponds to
Tarski’s axiom (R9) in Table 6. Dunn said (R9)
“does not correspond to any formula in the primitive vocabulary of R, nor do I
know of any such formula that it implies which is not also a theorem of R. So we
are left with a nagging question.” [6, p. 104]
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By Theorem 14 in §17, formula (41) is in the primitive vocabulary of R,
is not a theorem of R, and is valid in a model structure if and only if the
structure satisfies Ra∗bc ⇒ Racb, a frame condition equivalent to tagging
in the presence of the postulates for CR∗-model structures in §12. Formula
(41) happens to be 3-provable. Tarski had asked whether simply removing
the associative law would axiomatize the 3-provable equations. The answer is
no, but the 3-provable equations can be axiomatized by weakening the asso-
ciative law to a 3-provable version called the semi-associative law (Theorem
4 in §9). We define Tarski’s 3-variable classical relevant logic CT3 as the for-
mulas provable with 3 variables, while CT4 is set of formulas provable with
4 variables. Then (41) is in CT3 but not CR
∗.
§§2–9 summarize Tarski’s work on the foundations of the calculus of re-
lations and logic with finitely many variables. The details are taken from
[37]. §2 presents first order logic L, which is extended to L+ in §3. These
two formalisms are seen to be equipollent in §4. The equational formalism
L× appears in §5 and is compared to L+ in §6, where relation algebras RA,
representable relation algebras RRA, and equational logic are reviewed.
Tarski’s 3-variable formalisms L+3 and L3 are presented in §7, and are seen
to be equipollent with L× in §8. These formalisms include the associative law,
which requires four variables to prove. Weakening it to the semi-associative
law produces the equational formalism Lw×, seen to be equipollent to the
standardized 3-variable formalisms Ls and L+s in §9.
Tarski’s relevance logics are defined in §10 and characterized in §13 in
terms of provability (using results from §8 and §9), sequent calculus (pre-
sented in §11), and model structures (discussed in §12). Many formulas and
derived rules of inference for CT3 are listed in §14. §15 has formulas that are
in CT4 (4-provable) but notCT3 (3-provable), such as the associative law for
fusion. §16 has formulas of R that hold only when fusion is commutative. §17
presents a formula that is in T3, is not in R, answers Dunn’s question, and
disproves a theorem of Kowalski (see §18). §19 has formulas in CT5 \CT4.
§20 defines TR, a proper extension of CT4 and CR∗. §21 links KR to sym-
metric dense relation algebras. §22 characterizes the Dunn-McColl logic RM
as an extension of T4. §23 has a concluding discussion and some questions.
2 First order logic L of binary relations
For Tarski and Givant, L is a first-order language with equality symbol
◦
1 and
exactly one binary relation symbol E, while M(n) is a first-order language
with equality
◦
1 and exactly n binary relation symbols, n ≥ 0. We assume
instead that 1
,
is the equality symbol of L and that L has a countable
infinite set Π of binary relation symbols (including 1
,
), but no function sym-
bols or constants. The elements of Π are called atomic predicates, and
those that are distinct from 1
,
are also called propositional variables. The
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connectives of L are implication ⇒ and negation ¬, and the quantifier
is ∀. The atomic formulas of L are the ones of the form xAy, where x, y are
variables and A ∈ Π is an atomic predicate. For example, x1
,
y is an atomic
formula since 1
,
∈ Π . The set of formulas of L is Φ, defined as the inter-
section of every set that contains the atomic formulas and includes ϕ ⇒ ψ,
¬ϕ, and ∀xϕ for every variable x whenever it contains ϕ and ψ. The set of
sentences of L (formulas with no free variables) is Σ. The connectives ∨,
∧, ⇔, and quantifier ∃ are defined on formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ by ϕ∨ψ = ¬ϕ⇒ ψ,
ϕ ∧ ψ = ¬(ϕ⇒ ¬ψ), ϕ⇔ ψ = ¬((ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ ¬(ψ ⇒ ϕ)), and ∃xϕ = ¬∀x¬ϕ
for any variable x.
In formulating axioms and deductive rules for L, Tarski and Givant [37,
p. 8] adopted the system S1 of Tarski [36], which provides axioms for the
logically valid sentences and requires only the rule MP of modus ponens
(to infer B from A → B and A). Tarski’s system S2 provides axioms for
the logically valid formulas (not just the sentences), and uses the rule of
generalization (to infer ∀xϕ from ϕ) as well as MP. The systems S1 and S2
in Tarski [36] were obtained by modifying a system of Quine [31, 32, 33, 34]
which also uses only MP. Tarski’s systems avoid the notion of substitution.
Henkin [10, 11] proved Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem for the case in which
there are relation symbols of arbitrary finite rank but no constants and no
function symbols. He used MP and a restricted form of generalization as
rules of inference. Tarski [36, Th. 1, Th. 5] proved that his systems S1 and S2
are complete by deriving Henkin’s axioms and noting that both systems are
semantically sound.
For every formula ϕ ∈ Φ, the closure [ ϕ ] of ϕ is a sentence obtained
by universally quantifying ϕ with respect to every free variable in ϕ. The
closure operator is determined by the following conditions: if ϕ ∈ Σ is a
sentence, then [ ϕ ] = ϕ, and if x is the last variable (in the ordering of the
variables) that occurs free in ϕ, then [ ϕ ] = [ ∀xϕ ]. The logical axioms for
L are (AI)–(AIX), where ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ and x, y are variables, shown in Table 3.
If Ψ ⊆ Σ, then a sentence ϕ ∈ Σ is provable in L from Ψ , written Ψ ⊢ ϕ
or ⊢ ϕ if Ψ = ∅, iff ϕ is in the intersection of all sets that contain Ψ and the
axioms of L, and are closed under MP. Two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ are provably
equivalent in L, written ϕ ≡ ψ, if {ϕ} ⊢ ψ and {ψ} ⊢ ϕ.
3 Extending L to L+
Tarski and Givant extend L to L+ by adding two binary and two unary
operators that act on relation symbols and produce new relation symbols.
Π+, the set of predicates of L+, is the intersection of every set containing
Π that also contains A+B, A, A;B, and A−1 whenever it contains A and B.
Predicates obtained in distinct ways are distinct, so, for example, if A+B =
C + D then A = C and B = D. They add a second equality symbol ≖
Tarski’s classical relevant logic 5
Name of Set of Symbol for Axiom Deductive
formalism sentences provability schemata rules
L Σ ⊢ (AI)–(AIX) MP
L+ Σ+ ⊢+ plus (DI)–(DV) MP
L× Σ× ⊢× (R1)–(R10) Repl, Trans
L3 Σ3 ⊢3 (AI)–(AVIII)(AIX′)(AX) MP
L+
3
Σ+
3
⊢+
3
plus (DI)–(DV) MP
Lw× Σ× ⊢×s (R1)–(R3)(R4
′)(R5)–(R10) Repl, Trans
Ls3 Σ3 ⊢s (AI)–(AVIII)(AIX′) MP
Ls+
3
Σ+
3
⊢+s plus (DI)–(DV) MP
L4 Σ4 ⊢4 (AI)–(AVIII)(AIX′) MP
L+
4
Σ+
4
⊢+
4
plus (DI)–(DV) MP
Table 2 Axioms for F+ are those of F plus (DI)–(DV). Axioms for L× and RA coincide,
as do Lw× and SA. Formalisms between horizontal lines are equipollent.
[ (ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ ((ψ ⇒ ξ)⇒ (ϕ⇒ ξ)) ], (AI)
[ (¬ϕ⇒ ϕ)⇒ ϕ ], (AII)
[ ϕ⇒ (¬ϕ⇒ ψ) ], (AIII)
[ ∀x∀yϕ⇒ ∀y∀xϕ ], (AIV)
[ ∀x(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ (∀xϕ⇒ ∀xψ) ], (AV)
[ ∀xϕ⇒ ϕ ], (AVI)
[ ϕ⇒ ∀xϕ ], where x is not free in ϕ, (AVII)
[ ∃x(x1
,
y) ], where x 6= y, (AVIII)
[ x1
,
y ⇒ (ϕ⇒ ψ) ] where ϕ is atomic, x occurs in ϕ, (AIX)
and ψ is obtained from ϕ by replacing a single
occurrence of x by y.
Table 3 Axioms for first-order logic L
(they used =) and a formula A ≖ B, called an equation, for any predicates
A,B ∈ Π+. Σ× is the set of equations of L+. The atomic formulas of
L+ are xAy and A ≖ B, where x, y are variables and A,B ∈ Π+. Φ+ is the
set of formulas of L+, the intersection of every set containing the atomic
formulas of L+ that also contains ϕ ⇒ ψ, ¬ϕ, and ∀xϕ for every variable x
whenever it contains ϕ and ψ. Σ+ is the set of sentences of L+. Equations
have no free variables, so they are sentences: Σ× ⊆ Σ+.
The logical axioms of L+ [37, p. 25] are the logical axioms of L together
with the sentences in Table 4, where A,B ∈ Π+ and x, y, z are the first three
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variables. If Ψ ⊆ Σ+, then a sentence ϕ ∈ Σ+ is provable in L+ from Ψ ,
[ xA+ By ⇔ xAy ∨ xBy ] (DI)
[ xAy ⇔ ¬xAy ] (DII)
[ xA ;By ⇔ ∃z(xAz ∧ zBy) ] (DIII)
[ xA−1y ⇔ yAx ] (DIV)
A ≖ B ⇔ [ xAy⇔ xBy ] (DV)
Table 4 Definitional axioms for extension L+
written Ψ ⊢+ ϕ or ⊢+ ϕ if Ψ = ∅, iff ϕ is in the intersection of all sets that
contain Ψ and the axioms of L+, and are closed under MP. Two formulas
ϕ, ψ ∈ Π+ of L+ are provably equivalent in L+, written ϕ ≡+ ψ, if
{ϕ} ⊢+ ψ and {ψ} ⊢+ ϕ.
The calculus of relations may be defined as the set of sentences A ≖ B
such that ⊢+ A ≖ B. One may also consider it to be the closure of this set
under the propositional connectives, since Schro¨der and Tarski showed that
every propositional combination of equations is equivalent to an equation.
4 Equipollence of L and L+
L and L+ are expressively and deductively equipollent. To prove this, Tarski
recursively defined a translation (or elimination) mapping G from for-
mulas of L+ to (what turn out to be logically equivalent) formulas of L [37,
2.3(iii)]. G eliminates operators in accordance with the definitional axioms
(DI)–(DV). If ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ+, x, y are variables, and A,B are relation symbols
of L+, then the conditions determining G are shown in Table 5. From the
first four conditions it follows that G leaves formulas of L unchanged. The
next result states that L is a subformalism of L+, and L is expressively and
deductively equipollent with L+. Part (4) is the main mapping theorem
for L and L+.
Theorem 1. [37, §2.3]
1. Φ ⊆ Φ+ and Σ ⊆ Σ+. [2.3(i)]
2. G maps Φ+ onto Φ and Σ+ onto Σ. [2.3(iv)(δ)]
3. ϕ ≡+ G(ϕ) for every ϕ ∈ Φ+. [2.3(iv)(ε)]
4. Ψ ⊢+ ϕ iff {G(ψ) : ψ ∈ Ψ} ⊢G(ϕ), for all Ψ ⊆ Σ+ and ϕ ∈ Σ+. [2.3(v)]
5. Ψ ⊢+ ϕ iff Ψ ⊢ ϕ, for all Ψ ⊆ Σ and ϕ ∈ Σ. [2.3(ii)(ix)].
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G(xAy) = xAy if A ∈ Π,
G(ϕ⇒ ψ) = G(ϕ)⇒ G(ψ),
G(¬ϕ) = ¬G(ϕ),
G(∀xϕ) = ∀xG(ϕ),
G(xA+ By) = G(xAy) ∨G(xBy),
G(xAy) = ¬G(xAy),
G(xA ;By) = ∃z(G(xAz) ∧G(zBy))
where z is the first variable distinct from x, y,
G(xA−1y) = G(yAx),
G(A ≖ B) = [G(xAy)⇔ G(xBy) ]
where x, y are the first two variables.
Table 5 Definition of elimination mapping G : Φ+ → Φ.
5 Equational formalism L×
Tarski and Givant define a formalism L× with equational axioms and deduc-
tive rules for equality. The axioms of L× are (R1)–(R10), where A,B,C ∈
Π+, shown in Table 6. (R1)–(R10) are the axioms for relation algebras. De-
A+B ≖ B + A, (R1)
A+ (B + C) ≖ (A+ B) + C, (R2)
A+ B +A+B ≖ A, (R3)
A ;(B ;C) ≖ (A ;B);C, (R4)
(A+ B);C ≖ A ;C +B ;C, (R5)
A ;1
,
≖ A, (R6)
(
A−1
)
−1
≖ A, (R7)
(A+B)−1 ≖ A−1 + B−1, (R8)
(A ;B)−1 ≖ B−1 ;A−1, (R9)
A−1 ;A ;B +B ≖ B. (R10)
Table 6 Axioms of equational formalism L×
ducibility in L× is defined as it is in equational logic. The transitivity rule
Trans is to infer A ≖ B from A ≖ C and B ≖ C, and the replacement rule
Repl is to inferA−1 ≖ B−1, A ≖ B, C ;A ≖ C ;B, A;C ≖ B ;C, C+A ≖ C+B,
and A+C ≖ B+C from A ≖ B. See [37, §3.1] for further discussion of these
rules. For any Ψ ⊆ Σ×, an equation ε ∈ Σ× is provable in L× from Ψ ,
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written Ψ ⊢× ε or ⊢× ε if Ψ = ∅, iff ε is in the intersection of all sets that
contain Ψ and the axioms of L×, and are closed under Trans and Repl.
6 Comparing L× with L+
L× is a subformalism of L+; it has a subset of its sentences, Σ× ⊆ Σ+, and
it is easy to prove, using the completeness of Tarski’s axiomatization, that
provability in L× implies provability in L+. L× is weaker than L and L+ in
means of expression. This is due to Korselt’s result, reported by Lo¨wenheim
[15], that no equation in Σ× is logically equivalent to a sentence asserting
the existence of four distinct objects, such as
[ ∃w¬(w1
,
x ∨ w1
,
y ∨ w1
,
z) ].
Korselt’s theorem was greatly generalized by Tarski [37, 3.5(viii)].
Tarski knew only that he could prove in L× the “hundreds of theorems”
of Schro¨der. Does he still need L+? Is every equation provable in L+ already
provable in L×? Tarski wrote in the early 1940s, “It seems very probable that
the answer to these questions is affirmative” [35, p. 169]. To make sense of
these problems, define the predicate algebra to be
P =
〈
Π+,+, , ; ,−1, 1
,〉
.
Let A be an algebra with the same similarity type as P, say
A =
〈
S,+, , ; ,−1, 1
,〉
,
where S is a set, 1
,
∈ S, + and ; are binary operations on S, and and
−1 are unary operations on S. An equation A ≖ B ∈ Σ× is true in A
if h(A) = h(B) for every homomorphism h : P → A. The algebra A is a
relation algebra if the equations (R1)–(R10) are true in A for all predicates
A,B,C ∈ Π+. A is commutative if the equation A;B ≖ B ;A is true in A
for all A,B ∈ Π+, dense if A ≤ A;A is true in A for every A ∈ Π+, and
symmetric if A−1 ≖ A is true in A for every A ∈ Π+.
For example, the relations <, >, ≤, and ≥ on the rationals Q are called
dense linear orderings because they satisfy the equation A ≤ A;A, which
asserts that between any two rationals there is another. Along with the empty
relation ∅, universal relation Q2, diversity relation 6=, and identity relation =,
they form an 8-element commutative dense relation algebra called the Point
Algebra. Belnap’s M0 [3] is obtained by using only the operations ∨, ∧, →,
and ∼ from Table 1 [25, Theorem 4.1].
The next lemma, a special case of the completeness theorem for equational
logic, provides the link between relation algebras and deducibility in L×.
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Lemma 1. An equation is provable in L× if and only if it is true in every
relation algebra, that is, if A ≖ B ∈ Σ× then ⊢× A ≖ B is equivalent to
the condition that h(A) = h(B) for every A ∈ RA and every homomorphism
h : P→ A.
Proof. Let Θ be the set of equations true in every RA. By the definition of RA,
the axioms (R1)–(R10) are in Θ. Next we show that Θ is closed under the rules
Trans and Repl. To see this for Trans, assume A ≖ C and B ≖ C are in Θ. We
must showA ≖ B is inΘ, so assume that we have a homomorphism h : P→ A
for some A ∈ RA. Since A ≖ C and B ≖ C are in Θ, we have h(A) = h(C)
and h(B) = h(C), hence h(A) = h(B). Thus A ≖ B in Θ. For Repl, assume
A ≖ B is in Θ. To show the conclusions of Repl are in Θ, we assume that
we have a homomorphism h : P → A for some A ∈ RA. Since A ≖ B ∈ Θ,
we have h(A) = h(B). This implies (h(A))
−1
= (h(B))
−1
, h(A) = h(B),
and, for any C ∈ Π+, h(A);h(C) = h(B);h(C), h(C);h(A) = h(C);h(B),
h(A) + h(C) = h(B) + h(C), and h(C) + h(A) = h(C) + h(B). Since h
is a homomorphism, h(A−1) = h(B−1), h(A) = h(B), h(A;C) = h(B ;C),
h(C ;A) = h(C ;B), h(A + C) = h(B + C), and h(C + A) = h(C + B), so
the conclusions of Repl are also in Θ. Since Θ is a set containing the axioms
of L× and is closed under the rules of inference of L×, it contains the set of
equations provable in L×. This shows that if an equation is provable in L×
then it is true in RA.
For the converse, we need to construct quotient algebras of P. Define the
binary relation ≈× on Π+ by A ≈× B iff ⊢× A ≖ B for A,B ∈ Π+.
Because of the rules Trans and Repl, ≈× is a congruence relation on P, and
so it determines a quotient homomorphism q : Π+ → {A/≈× : A ∈ Π+}
that carries each predicate A to its equivalence class A/≈× under ≈×. The
quotient algebraP/≈× is a relation algebra. To show this, we assume k : P→
P/≈× is a homomorphism and show for any axiom A ≖ B that k(A) = k(B).
We do just one example, say an instance A+B ≖ B +A of (R1). There are
C,D ∈ Π+ such that k(A) = C/≈× and k(B) = D/≈×, so
k(A+B) = k(A) + k(B) k is a homomorphism
= (C/≈×) + (D/≈×)
= (C +D)/≈× quotient homomorphism
= (D + C)/≈× provability of (R1) in L
×
= (D/≈×) + (C/≈×) quotient homomorphism
= k(B) + k(A)
= k(B +A) k is a homomorphism
Proofs for the other axioms are similar.
Now suppose that A ≖ B is not provable in L×. We wish to show it is
not in Θ, i.e., there is some A ∈ RA and some homomorphism h : P → A
such that h(A) 6= h(B). Let A = P/≈× ∈ RA and h(C) = C/≈× for every
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C ∈ Π+. Since A ≖ B is not provable, the equivalence classes A/≈× and
B/≈× are distinct, hence h(A) 6= h(B) and the equation is not true in every
RA because it fails in A.
A relation algebra A =
〈
S,+, , ; ,−1, 1
,〉
is proper if there is an equiva-
lence relation E ∈ S such that S is a set of binary relations included in E, +
is union, is complementation with respect to E, ; is relative multiplication,
−1 is converse, and 1
,
is the identity part of E,
A+B = {〈x, y〉 : xAy ∨ xBy}, (union)
A = {〈x, y〉 : xEy ∧ ¬xAy}, (comp)
A;B = {〈x, y〉 : ∃z(xAz ∧ zBy)}, (rel-pr)
A−1 = {〈x, y〉 : yAx}, (conv)
1
,
= {〈x, x〉 : xEx}. (id)
A relation algebra is representable if it is isomorphic to a proper relation
algebra. Let RA be the class of relation algebras, and let RRA be the class
of representable relation algebras. Since Tarski’s axioms (R1)–(R10) hold for
binary relations, RRA ⊆ RA. An equivalent way to ask Tarski’s question is,
are RRA and RA the same?
If a relation algebra A is representable, then for all A,B ∈ Π+ and every
homomorphism h : P→ A, ⊢+ A ≖ B implies h(A) = h(B). There is an easy
proof of this using the completeness theorem for L (and the assumption that
Π has countably many relation symbols, by the way). Therefore, if A is a
non-representable relation algebra, there are A,B ∈ Π+ such that ⊢+ A ≖ B
but 6 ⊢× A ≖ B because h(A) 6= h(B) for some homomorphism h : P → A,
i.e., some equation is provable in L+ but not L×, answering Tarski’s question
in the negative.
There are countably many relation symbols in Π , so any non-representable
relation algebra suffices to show L× is weaker than L+ in means of proof.
The first to find an algebra in RA \ RRA was Lyndon [16]. However, since
Tarski and Givant assume L has exactly one binary relation symbol besides
equality, they need a non-representable relation algebra generated by a single
element. The non-representable relation algebra found by McKenzie [27] has
this property. Givant used it to construct an equation, simplified later by
George McNulty and Tarski, that is provable in L+ but not in L× [37, 3.4(vi)
and p. 54].
7 Three-variable formalisms L+3 and L3
L× is weaker than L+ and L. In fact, L× seems to be correlated with the
logic of three variables, since Korselt’s sentence uses four variables, while
G(A ≖ B) contains at most three. Indeed, for everyA,B ∈ Π+, it is apparent
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from the definition of G that if neither A nor B contains an occurrence of ;,
then G(A ≖ B) has only the first two variables occurring in it, while if ;
occurs in A or B, then G(A ≖ B) has the first three variables in it. This
suggests that perhaps every sentence containing only the first three variables
is logically equivalent to an equation in Σ×. Tarski was able to show that
this is actually the case. For every finite n ≥ 3 let Φ+n be the set of formulas
in Φ+ that contain only the first n variables, and let
Φn = Φ ∩ Φ
+
n , Σn = Σ ∩ Φ
+
n , Σ
+
n = Σ
+ ∩ Φ+n .
Tarski’s theorem that every sentence in Σ+3 is logically equivalent to an equa-
tion in Σ× suggests that Σ+3 could be the set of sentences of a formalism L
+
3 ,
equipollent with L× in means of proof as well as expression, and also equipol-
lent with a subformalism L3 of L having Σ3 as its set of sentences and the
restriction of G to Σ+3 as the translation mapping between L
+
3 of L3.
Tarski’s initial proposal came in two parts. First, Tarski proposed restrict-
ing the axioms (AI)–(AIX) and the rule MP to those instances that belong
to Σ+3 . Givant found these restricted axioms were too weak and suggested
replacing (AIX) with (AIX′), called the general Leibniz law, which is for-
mulated in terms of a variant type of substitution defined by Tarski-Givant
[37, pp. 66–67]:
[ x1
,
y ⇒ (ϕ⇒ ϕ[x/y]) ]. (AIX′)
The variant substitution is somewhat involved, so Tarski and Givant bor-
rowed an idea from [18] to formulate an alternate axiom schema (AIX′′). For
any two variables x, y, let Sxyϕ be the result of interchanging variables x and
y throughout formula ϕ. The function Sxy : Φ
+ → Φ+ is determined by these
rules:
Sxy(ϕ⇒ ψ) = Sxy(ϕ)⇒ Sxy(ψ),
Sxy(¬ϕ) = ¬Sxy(ϕ),
Sxy(∀vϕ) = ∀vˆSxy(ϕ),
Sxy(vAw) = vˆAwˆ, where xˆ = y, yˆ = x, and vˆ = v if v 6= x, y.
Givant proved that the following variant of (AIX′) can be used instead of
(AIX′) in the axiomatization of L+3 .
[ x1
,
y ⇒ (ϕ⇒ Sxyϕ) ]. (AIX
′′)
Tarski knew by the early 1940s that (R4) could not be proved with only three
variables, and would have to be included in the axiomatization of L+3 by fiat.
The second part of Tarski’s proposal was to include the general associativity
schema:
[ ∃z(∃y(ϕ[x, y] ∧ ψ[y, z]) ∧ ξ[z, y])
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⇔ ∃z(ϕ[x, z] ∧ ∃x(ψ[z, x] ∧ ξ[x, y]))]. (AX)
This schema involves the complicated substitution, but Givant proved it could
be replaced by the following variant of (AX), in which the free variables of
formulas ϕ, ψ, ξ are just x and y,
[ ∃z(∃y(ϕ ∧ Sxzψ) ∧ Sxzξ)⇔ ∃z(Syzϕ ∧ ∃x(Syzψ ∧ ξ) ]. (AX′)
The sets of sentences of L+3 and L3 are Σ
+
3 and Σ3, respectively, their axioms
are the sentences in Σ+3 and Σ3, respectively, that are instances of (AI)–
(AVIII), (AIX′), or (AX), and their rule of inference isMP. For simpler axiom
sets, use (AIX′′) and (AX′) instead of (AIX′) and (AX). For any Ψ ⊆ Σ+3 , a
sentence ψ ∈ Σ+3 is provable in L
+
3 from Ψ , written Ψ ⊢
+
3 ψ or ⊢
+
3 ψ if
Ψ = ∅, if ψ is in the intersection of all sets that contain Ψ and the axioms of
L+3 , and are closed under MP. Similarly, for ψ ∈ Σ3 and Ψ ⊆ Σ3, we define
provable in L3 from Ψ , written Ψ ⊢3 ψ.
8 Equipollence of L×, L3, and L
+
3
With Givant’s changes, Tarski’s proposal worked, and provided a three-
variable restriction L+3 of L
+, and a three-variable restriction L3 of L, both
equipollent with L× in means of expression and proof. For the equipollence
of L+3 of L
+, the appropriate translation mapping is simply the restriction
of G to Σ+3 . The restricted G maps Φ
+
3 onto Φ3 [37, 3.8(ix)(δ)]. For the
equipollence of L3 and L× Tarski and Givant define a recursive function
H : Φ+3 → Φ
+
3 [37, 3.9(iii)]. However, concerning H they said,
“The construction used here to establish these equipollence results has clearly some
serious defects, . . . The splintered character of the definition of the translation map-
ping H, . . . the involved notion of substitution . . . is another detrimental factor.
As a final result, the construction is so cumbersome . . . in the proofs . . . that we
did not even attempt to present them in full. A different construction that would
remove most of the present defects would be very desirable indeed.” [37, p. 87]
For another description of H see [8]. For two simpler alternative construc-
tions see [24, Theorem 552 and pp. 548–550]. The key equipollence results,
including the two main mapping theorems, are listed here.
Theorem 2. [37, §3.8] Formalisms L3 and L
+
3 are equipollent.
1. Φ3 ⊆ Φ
+
3 and Σ3 ⊆ Σ
+
3 [3.8(viii)(α)],
2. G maps Φ+3 onto Φ3 and Σ
+
3 onto Σ3 [3.8(ix)(δ)],
3. ϕ ≡+3 G(ϕ) if ϕ ∈ Φ
+
3 [3.8(ix)(ε)],
4. Ψ ⊢+3 ϕ iff G(Ψ) ⊢3 G(ϕ), for Ψ ⊆ Σ
+
3 and ϕ ∈ Σ
+
3 [3.8(xi)],
5. Ψ ⊢+3 ϕ iff Ψ ⊢3 ϕ, for all Ψ ⊆ Σ3 and ϕ ∈ Σ3, [3.8(xii)(β), 3.8(viii)(β)].
Theorem 3. [37, §3.9] Formalisms L× and L+3 are equipollent.
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1. Σ× ⊆ Σ+3 [3.9(i)],
2. H maps Σ+3 onto Σ
× [3.9(iii)(δ)],
3. ϕ ≡+3 H(ϕ) if ϕ ∈ Φ
+
3 [3.9(iii)(ε)],
4. Ψ ⊢+3 ϕ iff H(Ψ) ⊢
× H(ϕ), for Ψ ⊆ Σ+3 and ϕ ∈ Σ
+
3 [3.9(vii)],
5. Ψ ⊢+3 ϕ iff Ψ ⊢
× ϕ for all Ψ ⊆ Σ× and ϕ ∈ Σ× [3.9(ix)].
9 Equipollence of Lw×, Ls, and L
+
s
Since Tarski and Givant included (AX) only to achieve equipollence, they
defined the “(standardized) formalisms” Ls3 and Ls
+
3 , obtained by deleting
(AX) from the axiom sets of L3 and L
+
3 , and said, “These standardized
formalisms are undoubtedly more natural and more interesting in their own
right than L3 and L
+
3 .” [37, p. 89]. They asked, would deleting (R4) from
the axioms of L× produce a formalism equipollent with the standardized
formalisms Ls3 and Ls
+
3 ? The answer is “no”, because the semi-associative
law
A;(B ;1) ≖ (A;B);1, (R4
′)
where 1 = 1
,
+1
,
, is provable in Ls+3 but cannot be derived from the remaining
axioms (R1)–(R3) and (R5)–(R10). Another example of an equation provable
in Ls+3 but not from the remaining axioms is
A;1 ≖ (A;1);1.
Adding either one of these as an axiom produces a formalism equipollent
with standardized 3-variable logic. Therefore Tarski and Givant defined Lw×
as the “weakened” formalism obtained by replacing (R4) with (R4
′) in the
axiomatization of L×. The axioms of Lw× are (R1)–(R3), (R4′), (R5)–(R10).
This is the axiom set for the class SA of semi-associative relation alge-
bras. For any Ψ ⊆ Σ×, an equation ε ∈ Σ× is provable in Lw× from Ψ ,
written Ψ ⊢×s ε or ⊢
×
s ε if Ψ = ∅, iff ε belongs to every set that contains
Ψ and the axioms of Lw×, and is closed under Trans and Repl. The equipol-
lence of Lw× with Ls3 and Ls
+
3 is stated in the next theorem and was noted
by Tarski-Givant [37, p. 89, p. 209]. Part (4) tells us, “The axioms for SA
characterize the equations provable with three variables.”
Theorem 4. [18, Theorem 11(31)] Formalisms Lw×, Ls3, and Ls
+
3 are equipol-
lent.
1. ϕ ≡+s G(ϕ) ≡
+
s H(ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ Φ
+
3 ,
2. Ψ ⊢+s ϕ iff G(Ψ) ⊢s G(ϕ) iff H(Ψ) ⊢
×
s H(ϕ), for all Ψ ⊆ Σ
+
3 , ϕ ∈ Σ
+
3 ,
3. Ψ ⊢+s ϕ iff Ψ ⊢s ϕ, for all Ψ ⊆ Σ3, ϕ ∈ Σ3,
4. Ψ ⊢+s ϕ iff Ψ ⊢
×
s ϕ for all Ψ ⊆ Σ
×, ϕ ∈ Σ×.
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Tarski-Givant [37, p. 91] also define formalisms Ln and L+n for every finite
n ≥ 4, imitating the definitions of Ls3 and Ls
+
3 , but with n in place of 3. Thus
the sets of formulas of Ln and L
+
n are Φn and Φ
+
n , the sets of sentences are
Σn and Σ
+
n , the sets of axioms are those instances of axiom schemata (AI)–
(AVIII) and (AIX′) that lie in Σn and Σ
+
n , and the only rule of inference is
MP.
The next theorem involves the first of these formalisms, when n = 4.
As was noted by Tarski-Givant [37, p. 92], Theorem 5 tells us that a 3-
variable sentence can be proved with 4 variables if and only if it can be proved
with 3 variables together with the assumption that relative multiplication is
associative, and an equation is true in every relation algebra if and only if it
can be proved with 4 variables. To Tarski’s question, whether the definition
of RA “is justified in any intrinsic sense,” Theorem 5(3) answers, “Tarski’s
axioms for RA characterize the equations provable with four variables”. We
can informally express the theorem as a slogan:
“True in RA = 4-provable = 3-provable with associativity.”
Theorem 5. [22, Theorem 24]
1. Ψ ⊢+3 ψ iff Ψ ⊢
+
4 ψ, for all Ψ ⊆ Σ
+
3 and ψ ∈ Σ
+
3 ,
2. Ψ ⊢3 ψ iff Ψ ⊢4 ψ, for all Ψ ⊆ Σ3 and ψ ∈ Σ3,
3. Ψ ⊢× ψ iff Ψ ⊢+4 ψ, for all Ψ ⊆ Σ
× and ψ ∈ Σ×.
10 Tarski’s relevance logics Tn and CTn, 3 ≤ n ≤ ω
Let →, ∼, and ◦ be operators on Π+ defined in the predicate algebra P by
A→ B = A−1 ;B, ∼A = A−1, A ◦B = B ;A.
According to Dunn’s posted comments in 1992, he wanted to avoid this defi-
nition of residual→, because “a ‘random’ converse is thrown in . . . that would
lead to some undesirable properties in relevance logic”, but he noted many
sources for interpreting De Morgan negation as converse-complementation.
Fusion is order-reversed relative multiplication, but this distinction can be
ignored for systems in which it is commutative. The symbols ∨ and ∧ have
already appeared as connectives in L, but will also be used here to denote
operators on Π+ defined by
A ∨B = A+B, A ∧B = A+B.
For their classical relevant logics, Routley and Meyer introduce Boolean
negation ¬ (designated by a symbol already used to denote negation in L
but given a second meaning here) and the Routley star ∗, defined by
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¬A = A, A∗ = A−1.
These definitions produce the standard connection between → and ◦,
∼(A→ ∼B) =
(
A−1 ;B−1
)−1
≈× B ;A = A ◦B,
and match the interpretations in Table 1. For example, if A,B ∈ Π , then by
the definition of G and cancellation of double negations,
G(xA→ By) = ¬¬∀z¬¬
(
zAx⇒ ¬¬zBy
)
≡+ ∀z
(
zAx⇒ zBy
)
.
By the relevance logic operators we mean ∧, ∨, →, ∼, and ;, while the
classical relevant logic operators are ∧, ∨,→,∼, ; , ¬, and ∗. The classical
relevant logic operators include the operators introduced by Tarski, so the
closure of Π under the classical relevant logic operators is Π+. On the other
hand, the closure of Π under the relevance logic operators is a proper subset
of Π+, called Πr. For any A,B ∈ Π+, let A ≤ B be the equation A+ B ≖
B ∈ Σ×. Suppose 3 ≤ n ≤ ω and Ψ ⊆ Σ×. Tarski’s Ψ-based classical
relevant logic of n variables is
CTΨn = {A : Ψ ⊢
+
n 1
,
≤ A, A ∈ Π+},
and Tarski’s Ψ-based relevance logic of n variables is
TΨn = Π
r ∩CTΨn .
The equations in Ψ are the non-logical assumptions. We omit reference
to Ψ when it is empty.
11 Sequent calculus
The sequent calculus (for proving formulas in first-order logic) and model
structures (for the semantic characterization of various relevance logics) are
presented here and in the next section. They are used in Theorems 9 and 10
below to characterize CT3 and CT4.
Assume n ≥ 3. An n-sequent is an ordered pair 〈Γ,∆〉 of sets Γ,∆ ⊆ Φn of
atomic formulas of Ln, written Γ |∆. We say Γ |∆ is an Axiom if Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅
or x1
,
x ∈ ∆ for some variable x. If Ψ is a set of n-sequents, then a sequent
is n-provable from Ψ (just n-provable when Ψ = ∅) if it is contained in
every set of n-sequents that includes Ψ and the Axioms, and is closed under
the rules of inference in Table 7. In these rules, Γ, Γ ′, ∆,∆′ ⊆ Φn are sets
of atomic formulas, A,B ∈ Π+ are predicates, and x, y, z are among the
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first n variables. The notation “no y” in rule ;| means that y 6= x, z and y
does not occur in any formula in Γ or ∆. The rules are taken from [20] but
use notation for the classical relevant logic operators. The rules |∧ and ∧|
are derived from the rules for ¬ and ∨ through the definition of ∧. In the
notation for sequents, braces are frequently omitted. By [20, Theorem 2], the
Id
xAy, Γ |∆
xAz, z1
,
y, Γ |∆
Cut
Γ |∆, xAy
xAy, Γ ′ |∆′
Γ, Γ ′ |∆, ∆′
∨|
xAy, Γ |∆
xBy, Γ ′ |∆′
xA ∨ By, Γ, Γ ′ |∆, ∆′
|∨
Γ |∆, xAy, xBy
Γ |∆, xA ∨ By
∧|
Γ, xAy, xBy |∆
Γ, xA ∧ By |∆
|∧
Γ |∆, xAy
Γ ′ |∆′, xBy
Γ, Γ ′ |∆, ∆′, xA ∧ By
¬|
Γ |∆, xAy
x¬Ay, Γ |∆
|¬
xAy, Γ |∆
Γ |∆, x¬Ay
; |
xAy, yBz, Γ |∆
xA ;Bz, Γ |∆, no y
| ;
Γ |∆, xAy
Γ ′ |∆′, yBz
Γ, Γ ′ |∆, ∆′, xA ;Bz
∗|
xAy, Γ |∆
yA∗x, Γ |∆
|∗
Γ |∆, xAy
Γ |∆, yA∗x
Table 7 Rules of inference for the sequent calculus
sequent xAy |xBy (where x, y are the first two variables) is n-provable if and
only if A ≤ B is true in every MAn (a class of algebras later called RAn).
The key facts about MAn are MA3 = SA, MA4 = RA, and MAω = RRA by
[20, Theorem 6], and MAω =
⋂
3≤n<ωMAn by [20, Theorem 10]. The next
lemma illustrates the sequent calculus and provides a condition used later to
show F → G ∈ CT3.
Lemma 2. If A,B,C,D ∈ Π+ then the sequent yFx | yGx is 3-provable,
where F = A;B ∧ C and G = (A ∧ ∼D);B ∨ A;(B ∧D ;C).
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Proof. The sequence of sequents in Table 8 shows that yFx | yGx is 3-
provable. Only the first three variables x, y, z appear in any of the sequents.
Sequents 1, 2, 4, and 6 are Axioms. Every other sequent is 3-provable because
it is the conclusion of an instance of a rule of inference whose hypotheses are
one or two previous sequents. For example, sequent 3 is 3-provable because it
is the conclusion of an instance of rule | ; whose hypotheses are the 3-provable
sequents 1 and 2. The proof is a formalization of the following informal ar-
gument that, for binary relations A,B,C,D,
A;B ∩ C ⊆ A;(B ∩ ∼D) ∪ (A ∩ C ;D);B.
Assume yA;B ∧Cx. Then yCx and for some z, yAz and zBx. There are two
cases. In Case 1, xDz. Then yC ;Dz by yCx and xDz, so yA∧C ;Dz by yAz
and yC ;Dz, and finally y(A∧C ;D);Bx by yA∧C ;Dz and zBx. In Case 2,
x¬Dz. Then z∼Dx, so zB∧∼Dx by zBx, hence yA;(B∧∼D)x by yAz and
zB ∧ ∼Dx. In either case we conclude that yA;(B ∧ ∼D) ∨ (A ∧ C ;D);Bx.
Statement 14 asserts the 3-provability of a sequent expressing the inclusion
above.
1. yCx | yCx Axiom
2. xDz |xDz Axiom
3. yCx, xDz | yC ;Dz 1, 2, | ;
4. yAz | yAz Axiom
5. yAz, yCx, xDz | y(A ∧ C ;D)z 3, 4, |∧
6. zBx | zBx Axiom
7. zBx, yAz, yCx, xDz | y(A ∧C ;D);Bx 5, 6, | ;
8. zBx, yAz, yCx, zD∗x | y(A ∧C ;D);Bx 7, ∗|
9. zBx, yAz, yCx | z∼Dx, y(A ∧ C ;D);Bx 8, |¬, def ∼
10. zBx, yAz, yCx | zB ∧ ∼Dx, y(A ∧ C ;D);Bx 6, 9, |∧
11. zBx, yAz, yCx | yA ;(B ∧ ∼D)x, y(A ∧ C ;D);Bx 4, 10, | ;
12. zBx, yAz, yCx | yA ;(B ∧ ∼D) ∨ (A ∧C ;D);Bx 11, |∨
13. yA ;Bx, yCx | yA ;(B ∧∼D) ∨ (A ∧ C ;D);Bx 12, ;|, no z
14. yA ;B ∧ Cx | yA ;(B ∧ ∼D) ∨ (A ∧ C ;D);Bx 13, ∧|
Table 8 A sequence of 3-provable sequents
Lemma 3. If one of the sequents x1
,
y |xEy and |xEx is 3-provable, then
so is the other. The same is true for yAx | yBx and |xA→ Bx.
Proof. There are four directions. If one of the four sequents is 3-provable by
some sequence of sequents, one can then add sequents, ending up with one
of the other sequents, which is therefore also 3-provable. The first pair of
sequents is handled in Table 9, the second in Table 10.
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1. | xAx Hyp.
2. xAy |xAy Axiom
3. xAx, x1
,
y | xAy 2, Id
4. x1
,
y |xAy 1, 3, Cut
1. x1
,
y | xAy Hyp.
2. xAx |xAx Axiom
3. xAy, y1
,
x |xAx 2, Id
4. x1
,
y, y1
,
x |xAx 1, 3, Cut
5. x1
,
;1
,
x |xAx 4, ; |, no y
6. | x1
,
x Axiom
7. | x1
,
;1
,
x 6, | ;
8. | xAx 5, 7, Cut
Table 9 |xAx is 3-provable if and only if x1
,
y |xAy is 3-provable
1. yAx | yBx Hyp.
2. xA∗y | yBx 1, ∗|
3. xA∗y, y¬Bx | 2, ¬|
4. xA∗ ;¬Bx | 3, ;| no y
5. | x¬(A∗ ;¬B)x 4, |¬
6. | xA→ Bx 5, def →
1. | xA→ Bx Hyp.
2. | x¬(A∗ ;¬B)x 1, def →
3. xA∗ ;¬Bx | xA∗ ;¬Bx Axiom
4. xA∗ ;¬Bx, x¬(A∗ ;¬B)x | 3, ¬|
5. xA∗ ;¬Bx | 2, 4, Cut
6. yAx | yAx Axiom
7. yAx |xA∗y 6, |∗
8. yBx | yBx Axiom
9. | yBx, y¬Bx 8, |¬
10. yAx | yBx, xA∗ ;¬Bx 7, 9, | ;
11. yAx | yBx 5, 10, Cut
Table 10 yAx | yBx is 3-provable if and only if |xA→ Bx is 3-provable
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12 Model structures
A model structure is a quadruple K = 〈K,R, ∗, I〉 consisting of a set K, a
ternary relation R ⊆ K3, a unary operation ∗ : K → K, and a subset I ⊆ K.
The associated complex algebra of K is Cm (K) =
〈
℘(K),∪, , ; ,−1, I
〉
,
where ℘(K) is the set of subsets of K, and the operations ∪, , ; , and −1,
are defined on subsets X,Y ⊆ K by
X ∪ Y = {x : x ∈ X or x ∈ Y },
X = K \X,
X ;Y = {z : Rxyz for some x ∈ X , y ∈ Y },
X−1 = {z∗ : z ∈ X}.
A predicate A ∈ Π+ is valid in K if the equation 1
,
≤ A is true in Cm (K).
To see what this means, a little calculation shows that if A ∈ Π then, by
Theorem 2(3), 1
,
≤ A ≡+3 ∀xxAx. Any homomorphism from the predicate
algebra into Cm (K) must send 1
,
to I, so it follows that A ∈ Π+ is valid in
K if and only if I ⊆ h(A) for every homomorphism h : P→ Cm (K).
For every set U , let U =
〈
U2, R, ∗, I
〉
be the model structure of pairs
on U , where
U2 = {〈x, y〉 : x, y ∈ U}, (pairs)
R = {〈〈x, y〉 , 〈y, z〉 , 〈x, z〉〉 : x, y, z ∈ U}, (triples)
〈x, y〉∗ = 〈y, x〉 for all x, y ∈ U, (star)
I = {〈x, x〉 : x ∈ U}. (identity)
Then Re(U), the algebra of binary relations on U , is the complex algebra
of the model structure of pairs on U , Re(U) = Cm (U).
Consider the following conditions on a model structure K, written in the
first order language of one ternary relation symbol R, one unary function
symbol ∗, and one unary relation symbol I:
Rxyz ⇒ Rx∗zy, (l-refl)
Rxyz ⇒ Rzy∗x, (r-refl)
x = y ⇔ ∃u(Iu ∧Rxuy), (ident)
∃x(Rvwx ∧Rxyz)⇒ ∃uRvuz, (semi-Pasch)
∃x(Rvwx ∧Rxyz)⇒ ∃u(Rvuz ∧Rwyu), (Pasch)
Rxyz ⇒ Ryxz, (comm)
Rxxx, (dense)
x∗ = x. (symm)
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The first five conditions characterize the model structures whose complex
algebras are relation algebras or semi-associative relation algebras. For ex-
ample, they hold in the model structure of pairs on any set. The last three
conditions hold when the algebras are commutative, dense, or symmetric.
Theorem 6. [19, Theorem 2.2] For any model structure K = 〈K,R, ∗, I〉,
1. Cm (K) ∈ SA iff K satisfies (l-refl), (r-refl), (ident), (semi-Pasch).
2. Cm (K) ∈ RA iff K satisfies (l-refl), (r-refl), (ident), (Pasch).
Theorem 6 and the existence of canonical extensions entail the following
representation theorem. Along with Theorem 6, it characterizes RA and SA
as subalgebras of complex algebras of frames (model structures) satisfying
four frame conditions.
Theorem 7. [19, Theorem 4.3] If A =
〈
S,+, , ; ,−1, 1
,〉
∈ SA then there is
a model structure K = 〈K,R, ∗, I〉 such that
1. A ∼= A′ ⊆ Cm (K) for some subalgebra A′ of the complex algebra Cm (K),
2. Cm (K) is in SA,
3. K satisfies (l-refl), (r-refl), (ident), and (semi-Pasch),
4. Cm (K) is in RA if A ∈ RA,
5. if A ∈ RA then K satisfies (l-refl), (r-refl), (ident), and (Pasch).
Useful in the proofs of these last two theorems is
Lemma 4. Assume K = 〈K,R, ∗, I〉 is a model structure.
1. If (l-refl) and (ident) then a∗∗ = a for all a ∈ K.
2. If (l-refl), (r-refl), and (ident), then v = v∗ for all v ∈ I.
3. Assume (l-refl), (r-refl), (ident), and (semi-Pasch). If u, v ∈ I, Raua, and
Rava, then u = v.
Proof (1). Since a = a, by (ident) there must be some u ∈ I such that Raua.
Applying (l-refl) twice yields Ra∗∗ua, so we obtain a∗∗ = a by (ident).
Proof (2). Assume v ∈ I. By (ident) there is some u ∈ I such that Rvuv.
Then Rv∗vu by (l-refl) and Rvu∗v by (r-refl). From Rvu∗v we also have
Rv∗vu∗ by (l-refl). From Rv∗vu and Rv∗vu∗ we obtain v∗ = u∗ and v∗ = u
by (ident) since v ∈ I. From v∗ = u∗ we get v = u by part (1), so from
v∗ = u we get v∗ = v, as desired.
Proof (3). Assume u, v ∈ I, a ∈ K, Raua, and Rava. By (l-refl) we
get Ra∗au, and Ra∗av. From Ra∗au we get Rua∗a∗ by (r-refl). Apply
(semi-Pasch) to Rua∗a∗ and Ra∗av, obtaining some x ∈ K such that Ruxv.
Then Ru∗vx by (l-refl), so u∗ = x by (ident) since v ∈ I. We therefore have
Ruu∗v. But u∗ ∈ I by Lemma 4(2) since u ∈ I by assumption, hence u = v
by (ident).
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The classical relevant model structures were introduced by Meyer-Routley
[29, p. 184]. A CR∗-model structure is a model structure K = 〈K,R, ∗, I〉
such that I = {0} and for all a, b, c, d ∈ K,
p1. R0ab iff a = b,
p2. ∃x(Rabx ∧Rxcd) iff ∃y(Racy ∧Rybd),
p3. Raaa,
p4. a∗∗ = a,
p5. Rabc implies Rac∗b∗.
The classical relevant logic CR∗ is defined as the set of formulas valid in
all CR∗-model structures. These structures are commutative because
Lemma 5. If K = 〈K,R, ∗, I〉 is a model structure such that I = {0}, p1,
and p2, then (comm).
Proof. Assume Rabc. Get R0aa by p1. By p2, R0aa and Rabc imply there
is some y such that R0by and Ryac. However, R0by implies b = y by p1, so
Rbac.
When (comm) holds, we can restate p5 in two ways, by switching the
order of the first two entries in the conclusion, or interchanging a and b in
the conclusion.
Rabc⇒ Rbc∗a∗, (l-rot)
Rabc⇒ Rc∗ab∗. (r-rot)
In the presence of p1 and p2, the three postulates p5, (r-rot), (l-rot) are
equivalent.
Theorem 8. Assume K = 〈K,R, ∗, I〉, I = {0}, and Cm (K) is a commuta-
tive dense relation algebra. Then K is a CR∗-model structure.
Proof. Postulate p1 is what (ident) reduces to when I = {0}. For a given
a ∈ K, pick a propositional variable A ∈ Π and choose a homomorphism
h : P → Cm (K) such that h(A) = {a}. A ≤ A;A is true in Cm (K) since
Cm (K) is dense, so {a} ⊆ {a} ;{a}. By the definition of ;, this gives us Raaa,
so p3 holds. Condition p4 follows from (ident) and (l-refl) by Lemma 4(1).
For p5, assume Rabc. Then c ∈ {a} ;{b} but {a} ;{b} = {b} ;{a} since Cm (K)
is commutative, so Rbac. Then Rb∗ca by (l-refl), so Rac∗b∗ by (r-refl). Thus
p5 holds. To prove p2, assume Rabx and Rxcd. By (Pasch), Raud and Rbcu
for some u ∈ K, so Rcbu by commutativity. By (l-refl) and (r-refl), Ra∗du
and Rub∗c. By (Pasch), there is some y ∈ K such that Ra∗yc and Rdb∗y.
By (l-refl), (r-refl), and p4, Racy and Rybd. The opposite implication in p2
is the same.
Jo´nsson-Tarski [13, Th. 4.15] proved that every relation algebra is semi-
simple (isomorphic to a subdirect product of simple algebras); see Givant [9,
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Theorem 12.10]. Furthermore, every semi-associative relation algebra A ∈ SA
is semi-simple; see [18, Corollary 8(7)] or [24, Theorem 388]. By definition,
A is integral if 0 6= 1 and x;y = 0 implies x = 0 or y = 0. By [24, Theorem
379(iii)] or [18, Theorem 7(20)] or [23, Theorem 29], A is simple if and only if
0 6= 1, and for all x, y ∈ A, if 0 = (x;1);y then x = 0 or y = 0. Suppose A ∈ SA
is commutative and simple. We get 0 6= 1 from simplicity, and if x;y = 0, then
(x;1);y = (1;x);y = 1;(x;y) = 1;0 = 0 by commutativity and [24, (6.188)],
hence x = 0 or y = 0 by simplicity. This shows A is integral, so we conclude
1
,
is an atom of A by [24, Theorem 353]. Every commutative semi-associative
relation algebra is isomorphic to a subdirect product of algebras in which 1
,
is an atom.
For a special case of this situation, assume we have a model structure
K = 〈K,R, ∗, I〉 such that Cm (K) is a commutative semi-associative relation
algebra, or equivalently, K satisfies (l-refl), (r-refl), (ident), (semi-Pasch), and
(comm). For every u ∈ I, let Ku = K ;{u} = {u} ;K. Then {Ku : u ∈ I}
is a partition of K and {R ∩ (Ku)3 : u ∈ I} is a partition of R. Each Ku
is an ideal element of Cm (K) and is closed under ∗, so we may let Ku =〈
Ku, R ∩K3u,
∗|Ku , {u}
〉
. Then Cm (K) is isomorphic to a subalgebra of the
direct product
∏
u∈I Cm (Ku). Since validity in K is equivalent to validity in
Cm (Ku) for every u ∈ I, it follows that, when checking whether a formula
is true in every commutative semi-associative relation algebra, it suffices to
check those in which the identity element is an atom. Model structures whose
complex algebras are commutative dense integral relation algebras are CR∗-
model structures (but not conversely; see Theorem 14).
13 Characterizing CT3 and CT4
Theorem 9. For every A ∈ Π+, the following statements are equivalent.
1. A ∈ CT3,
2. ⊢+s 1
,
≤ A (provable in extended standardized 3-variable logic Ls+3 ),
3. ⊢×s 1
,
≤ A (provable in the equational logic Lw× of SA),
4. 1
,
≤ A is true in every SA,
5. A is valid in all structures satisfying (l-refl), (r-refl), (ident), (semi-Pasch),
6. the sequent |xAx is provable in the 3-variable sequent calculus,
7. ⊢s ∀xG(xAx) (provable in standardized 3-variable logic Ls3).
Proof. Parts (1) and (2) are equivalent by definition. Parts (2) and (3) are
equivalent by Theorem 4(4). Parts (3) and (4) are equivalent by Lemma 1
with SA, Lw×, and (R4
′) in place of RA, L×, and (R4). Parts (4) and (5)
are equivalent by Theorem 6(1). Parts (4) and (6) are equivalent by [20,
Theorems 2 and 6(1)] and Lemma 3. Parts (2) and (7) are equivalent by
Theorem 4(2) with Ψ = ∅ and ϕ = (1
,
≤ A).
Theorem 10. For every A ∈ Π+, the following statements are equivalent.
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1. A ∈ CT4,
2. ⊢+4 1
,
≤ A (provable in the extended 4-variable formalism L+4 ),
3. ⊢× 1
,
≤ A (provable in the equational formalism L× of RA),
4. 1
,
≤ A is true in every RA,
5. A is valid in model structures satisfying (l-refl), (r-refl), (ident), (Pasch),
6. the sequent |xAx is provable in the 4-variable sequent calculus,
7. ⊢4 ∀xG(xAx) (provable in the 4-variable formalism L4),
8. ⊢+3 1
,
≤ A (provable in extended 3-variable logic L+3 ),
9. ⊢3 ∀xG(xAx) (provable in the 3-variable formalism L3).
Proof. Parts (1) and (2) are equivalent by definition. Parts (2) and (3) are
equivalent by Theorem 5(3). Parts (3) and (4) are equivalent by Lemma 1.
Parts (4) and (5) are equivalent by Theorem 6(2). Parts (4) and (6) are
equivalent by [20, Theorems 2 and 6(2)] and Lemma 3. Part (8) is equivalent
to (2) by Theorem 5(1), equivalent to (3) by Theorem 3(5), and equivalent
to (9) by Theorem 2(5). Finally, (7) and (9) are equivalent by Theorem 5(2).
14 Theorems and rules of CT3
To show A ∈ CT3, it is enough by Theorem 9 to show |xAx is 3-provable,
but three variables may not all be needed. This leads to a classification of
formulas and rules according to the number of variables needed to prove
them. For example, the sequent |x1
,
x is provable because it is an Axiom,
and it is 1-provable because it contains only one variable. Therefore 1
,
is 1-
provable. Similarly, xAx |xAx is provable because it is an Axiom, and it is
1-provable. By Rule |¬, the sequent |xAx, x¬Ax is also 1-provable. Then by
Rule |∨, |xA ∨ ¬Ax is 1-provable, hence A ∨ ¬A ∈ CT3. Therefore A ∨ ¬A
is 1-provable. The Rule of Disjunctive Syllogism is 1-provable, in the sense
that, assuming |xA ∨Bx and |x∼Ax are 3-provable, we do not need to
introduce any additional variables to conclude that |xBx is 3-provable. If
one more variable besides x is used, the rule is said to be 2-provable. In the
next theorem, probably every formula (except (41)) is in CR∗, and probably
every derived rule also applies to CR∗.
Theorem 11. Among the theorems and derived rules of CT3, classified by
the number of variables needed for their proofs, there are 1-provable formulas
in CT3,
A ∨ ∼A (1)
A ∨ ¬A (2)
1
,
(3)
2-provable formulas in CT3,
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A→ A (4)
((A→ A)→ B)→ B (5)
A→ A ∨B (6)
B → A ∨B (7)
A ∧B → A (8)
A ∧B → B (9)
A ∨B → B ∨ A (10)
A ∧B → B ∧ A (11)
(A ∨B) ∨ C → A ∨ (B ∨C) (12)
(A ∧B) ∧ C → A ∧ (B ∧C) (13)
(A ∨B) ∧ C → (A ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧C) (14)
(A ∧B) ∨ C → (A ∨ C) ∧ (B ∨C) (15)
∼∼A→ A (16)
A→ ∼∼A (17)
∼(A ∨B)→ ∼A ∧ ∼B (18)
∼(A ∧B)→ ∼A ∨ ∼B (19)
∼A ∧ ∼B → ∼(A ∨B) (20)
∼A ∨ ∼B → ∼(A ∧B) (21)
∼A ∧ A→ B (22)
¬¬A→ A (23)
A→ ¬¬A (24)
¬(A ∨B)→ ¬A ∧ ¬B (25)
¬(A ∧B)→ ¬A ∨ ¬B (26)
¬A ∧ ¬B → ¬(A ∨B) (27)
¬A ∨ ¬B → ¬(A ∧B) (28)
¬A ∧ A→ B (29)
3-provable formulas in CT3,
(A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)→ (A→ B ∧ C) (30)
(A→ C) ∧ (B → C)→ (A ∨B → C) (31)
(A→ B) ∧ (C → D)→ (A ∧ C → B ∧D) (32)
(A→ B) ∧ (C → D)→ (A ∨ C → B ∨D) (33)
(A→ B) ∨ (C → D)→ (A ∧ C → B ∨D) (34)
A ◦B → ∼(A→ ∼B) (35)
∼(A→ ∼B)→ A ◦B (36)
(A→ B) ◦A→ B (37)
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A→ (B → A ◦B) (38)
A→ ((B → ∼A)→ ∼B) (39)
(A ◦B) ∧ C → (A ∧ (C ◦B∗)) ◦ (B ∧ (A∗ ◦ C)) (40)
(A ◦B) ∧ C → (A ∧ ∼D) ◦B ∨A ◦ (B ∧ (D ◦ C)) (41)
(A→ B) ∧ (C ◦D)→ ((C ∧B) ◦D) ∨ (C ◦ (D ∧ ∼A)) (42)
1-provable rules of CT3,
A, B ⊢ A ∧B (43)
A→ B, A ⊢ B (44)
A ∨B, ∼A ⊢ B (45)
A ⊢ A∗ (46)
2-provable rules of CT3,
A→ B, B → C ⊢ A→ C (47)
A→ B ⊢ ∼B → ∼A (48)
A→ ∼B ⊢ B → ∼A (49)
A ∧B → C, B → C ∨ A ⊢ B → C (50)
A ⊢ (A→ B)→ B (51)
A ∧D → C, B ∧ ¬D → C ⊢ A ∧B → C (52)
C ∧ E → A, D ∧ E → B ⊢ (C ∧D) ∧ E → A ∧B (53)
B ∧C∗ → A, E ∧ F ∗ → D ⊢ (B ∧ E) ∧ (C ∧ F )∗ → A ∧D (54)
B ∧ ¬C → A, E ∧ ¬F → D ⊢ (B ∧ E) ∧ ¬(C ∨ F )→ A ∧D (55)
B ∧ ¬C → A ∧ ¬A ⊢ B → C (56)
B ∧ C∗ → A ∧ ¬A ⊢ B → ∼C (57)
and 3-provable rules of CT3,
A→ B ⊢ (B → C)→ (A→ C) (58)
A→ B ⊢ (C → A)→ (C → B) (59)
A→ B, C → D ⊢ (B → C)→ (A→ D) (60)
A→ B, C → D ⊢ (A ◦ C)→ (B ◦D) (61)
A→ (B → C) ⊢ B → (∼C → ∼A) (62)
Although the Law of the Excluded Middle (2) is in CT3, Explosion (A ∧
∼A)→ B and Positive Paradox A→ (B → A) are not, because as relations
they need not contain the identity relation, for if 〈y, x〉 ∈ A, 〈x, y〉 /∈ A, and
〈y, x〉 /∈ B, then 〈x, x〉 /∈ (A ∧ ∼A) → B, and if 〈y, x〉 ∈ A, 〈z, y〉 ∈ B, and
〈z, x〉 /∈ A, then 〈x, x〉 /∈ A→ (B → A).
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15 A non-associative commutative dense SA
This section presents formulas that are valid for all relations but require 4
variables to prove.
Theorem 12. Formulas (63)–(67) are in CR∗ and CT4 but not CT3.
(A→ B)→ ((C → A)→ (C → B)) (63)
(A→ (B → C))→ ((A ◦B)→ C) (64)
((A ◦B)→ C)→ (A→ (B → C)) (65)
(A→ B)→ ((A ◦D)→ (B ◦D)) (66)
(A ◦B) ◦ C → A ◦ (B ◦ C) (67)
Proof. To show formulas (63)–(67) belong to CR∗ it suffices to check that
they are valid in all CR∗-model structures. They can be shown to be in CT4
by deriving them from the axioms for relation algebras or proving them in
the 4-variable sequent calculus. For example, by Theorem 10 and Lemma 3,
(67) is in CT4 because of the following sequence of sequents.
1. zBw | zBw Axiom
2. yCz | yCz Axiom
3. yCz, zBw | yC ;Bw 1, 2, | ;
4. wAx |wAx Axiom
5. yCz, zBw, wAx | y(C ;B);Ax 3, 4, | ;
6. yCz, zB ;Ax | y(C ;B);Ax 5, ; |, no w
7. yC ;(B ;A)x | y(C ;B);Ax 6, ; |, no z
8. y(A ◦B) ◦ Cx | yA ◦ (B ◦ C)x 7, def of ◦
To show formulas (63)–(67) cannot be proved with three variables, we use
a dense semi-associative relation algebra that is not associative. Let K1 =
〈K,R, ∗, 1
,
〉, where K = {a, b, c, 1
,
}, I = {1
,
}, x∗ = x for all x ∈ K, R ⊆ K3,
Rxyz means z ∈ {x} ;{y}, and ; is defined in Table 11. Then Cm (K1) ∼=
K1 =
; {1
,
} {a} {b} {c}
{1
,
} {1
,
} {a} {b} {c}
{a} {a} {1
,
, a} {c} {b}
{b} {b} {c} {1
,
, b} {a}
{c} {c} {b} {a} {1
,
, c}
Table 11 A non-associative dense semi-associative relation algebra
E4({1, 3}) ∈ SA by [19, Theorem 2.5(4)(a)]. This algebra arises by applying
Lyndon’s construction to a projective geometry consisting of a single line of
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order 2, i.e., one that contains 3 points. Lyndon [17, p. 24] pointed out that
this case can be accomodated by deleting the triples aaa, bbb, ccc from R.
The resulting structure is no longer dense, but is instead the Klein 4-group.
Choose a homomorphism h : P→ Cm (K1) so that h(A) = {x}, h(B) = {y},
and h(C) = {z}, where x, y, z ∈ {a, b, c}. Then
• (63) fails if x 6= y = z,
• (64) fails if x = y 6= z,
• (65) fails if x 6= y = z,
• (66) fails if x 6= y and z ∈ {x, y},
• (67) fails if x = y 6= z or |{x, y, z}| = 3.
16 A non-commutative dense representable RA
This section presents four formulas that are not in CT4 but appear in axiom-
atizations of relevance logics. The axiomatization of R by Anderson-Belnap
[1, §27.1.1] includes (68), (70), (71) as R12, R2, and R3, respectively. They
note [1, p. 20] that Church [5] used A→ A, (69), (70) and Contraction as ax-
ioms. Interpreted as relations, formulas (68)–(71) assert that certain relations
commute under fusion. Since there are non-commutative dense representable
relation algebras, these formulas are not even in CTω.
Theorem 13. For all A,B,C ∈ Π, the following four theorems of R are not
in CTω.
(A→ ∼B)→ (B → ∼A), (68)
(A→ (B → C))→ (B → (A→ C)), (69)
(A→ B)→ ((B → C)→ (A→ C)), (70)
A→ ((A→ B)→ B). (71)
Proof. Let K2 = 〈K,R,
∗, {1
,
}〉 be the model structure determined by K =
{1
,
, a, b, b∗}, 1
,∗ = 1
,
, a∗ = a, (b∗)∗ = b, R ⊆ K3, and Rxyz holds iff
z ∈ {x} ;{y}, where ; is specified in Table 12. One may check that K2 satisfies
K2 =
; {1
,
} {a} {b} {b∗}
{1
,
} {1
,
} {a} {b} {b∗}
{a} {a} {1
,
, a, b, b∗} {a, b} {a}
{b} {b} {a} {b} {1
,
, a, b, b∗}
{b∗} {b∗} {a, b∗} {1
,
, b, b∗} {b∗}
Table 12 The atom structure of a non-commutative dense representable relation algebra
the conditions required to conclude Cm (K2) ∈ RA by Theorem 6(2). Note
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that K2 is also dense, i.e., it satisfies Rxxx. On the other hand, Cm (K2) is
not commutative, so Contraposition (68), Permutation (69), Suffixing (70),
and Modus Ponens (71) are invalid. These formulas are invalidated in many
ways, but in rather few ways if the propositional variables are mapped to
singletons and the formulas are mapped to the empty set. A complete list of
such valuations has been calculated with GAP [7]. In Table 13 we list two
to four assignments under which each formula evaluates to ∅ and is therefore
invalid in K2.
(68) (69) (70) (71)
A B A B C A B C A B
{a} {b} {a} {b} {a} {1
,
} {a} {a} {a} {a}
{b} {b∗} {b∗} {a} {a} {1
,
} {b} {a} {b} {a}
{b∗} {a} {b} {a} {a}
{b} {b} {a}
Table 13 Ways that formulas (68)–(71) fail in Cm (K2)
To prove Contraposition (68), Permutation (69), Suffixing (70), and Modus
Ponens (71) are not in CTω it suffices to show Cm (K2) is isomorphic to a
proper relation algebra. A finite sequence is a function f with domain
dom(f) = {1, · · · , n} for some finite non-zero n. Let Q be the set of rational
numbers. Let U be the set of finite sequences of rational numbers. Define a
binary relation B ⊆ U × U for f, g ∈ U by fBg (we say f is below g or f
comes before g) iff for some finite n > 0, dom(f) = {1, · · · , n} ⊆ dom(g),
fi = gi for all i < n, and fn < gn. Let
σ(1
,
) = {〈x, x〉 : x ∈ U},
σ(b∗) = B,
σ(b) = B−1,
σ(a) = (U × U) \ (σ(1
,
) ∪B ∪B−1),
ρ(X) =
⋃
x∈X
σ(x) for all X ⊆ K.
Then ρ is an isomorphism from Cm (K2) onto a proper relation algebra, hence
every formula in CTω is valid in K2. Since (68)–(71) are not valid in K2, they
are not in CTω .
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17 A formula in T3 \ CR
∗
Theorem 14 shows that (41) is not in CR∗ and that it is equivalent to a
model structure property.
Theorem 14. Assume A,B,C,D ∈ Π,
F = A;B ∧ C,
G = (A ∧ ∼D);B ∨ A;(B ∧D ;C),
and K = 〈K,R, ∗, I〉 is a model structure. Then
1. F → G ∈ T3,
2. F → G /∈ CR∗,
3. the equation F ≤ G is true in Cm (K) if and only if K satisfies
Rd∗bc⇒ Rdcb. (l-refl′)
Proof (1). F → G ∈ CT3 by Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Theorem 9(1)(6), so
F → G ∈ T3 because F → G ∈ Πr.
Proof (2). To show F → G /∈ CR∗, we use a model structure whose complex
algebra is a Meyer monoid that is not a relation algebra. Let I = {1
,
} and
K = {1
,
, a, a∗} where 1
,∗ = 1
,
and (a∗)∗ = a. Let K3 = 〈K,R, ∗, {1
,
}〉 where
R ⊆ K3 is determined by Table 14.
K3 =
; {1
,
} {a} {a∗}
{1
,
} {1
,
} {a} {a∗}
{a} {a} {a, a∗} {1
,
, a, a∗}
{a∗} {a∗} {1
,
, a, a∗} {a∗}
Table 14 Cm (K3) is a Meyer monoid and not a relation algebra.
K3 is aCR
∗-model structure, so everything inCR∗ is valid in K3. Tagging,
(l-refl′), (l-refl), and (r-refl) all fail because 〈a, a, a∗〉 ∈ R but 〈a∗, a∗, a〉 /∈ R.
Choose a homomorphism h : P → Cm (K3) from the predicate algebra into
the complex algebra of K3 such that h(A) = h(B) = {a} and h(C) = h(D) =
{a∗}. Then Axiom (R9) fails and h(F → G) = ∅. Since h(1
,
) = I is not
contained in h(F → G), 1
,
≤ F → G is not true in Cm (K3), hence F → G is
not valid in K3 and F → G /∈ CR∗.
Proof (3). Assume K satisfies (l-refl′). We wish to prove F ≤ G is true in
Cm (K), i.e., h(F ) ⊆ h(G) for an arbitrary homomorphism h : P → Cm (K).
We assume c ∈ h(F ) and show c ∈ h(G). First compute
h(F ) = h(A;B ∧ C) = h(A);h(B) ∩ h(C),
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so c ∈ h(C) and there are a ∈ h(A) and b ∈ h(B) such that Rabc. There are
two cases. First, assume a ∈ h(∼D). Then
a ∈ h(A) ∩ h(∼D) = h(A ∧ ∼D).
From this and b ∈ h(B) we get c ∈ h((A ∧ ∼D);B). Since h(G) is the union
of this last set with another set, we have c ∈ h(G), as desired.
For the second case, assume a /∈ h(∼D) = K \ (h(D))−1. Then a ∈
(h(D))−1, so a = d∗ for some d ∈ h(D). Then Rd∗bc since Rabc, hence Rdcb
by (l-refl′), which gives us b ∈ h(D ;C). By this and b ∈ h(B), b ∈ h(B∧D ;C),
hence, by a ∈ h(A) and Rabc, c ∈ h(A;(B ∧D ;C)). Again, h(G) is the union
of this set with another set, so c ∈ h(G), as desired.
Assume we have a relevant model structure K = 〈K,R, ∗, I〉 in which
(l-refl′) fails, specifically, there are a, b, c ∈ K such that Ra∗bc and not Racb.
We will show F ≤ G is not true in Cm (K). Choose a homomorphism h : P→
Cm (K) so that propositional variables A,B,C,D ∈ Π have these values:
h(A) = {a∗}, h(B) = {b}, h(C) = {c}, h(D) = {a}.
Since Ra∗bc we have h(C) = {c} ⊆ {a∗} ;{b} = h(A);h(B) = h(A;B), so
h(F ) = h(A;B∧C) = h(A;B)∩h(C) = h(C) = {c}. Note that h(A∧∼D) =
h(A) ∩ h(∼D) = {a∗} ∩ (K \ {a∗}) = ∅, hence, independent of the value for
B,
h((A ∧∼D);B) = h(A ∧ ∼D);h(B) = ∅ ;h(B) = ∅. (α)
Since Racb is false, b /∈ {a} ;{c}, hence h(D ;C) = h(D);h(C) = {a} ;{c} ⊆
K \{b}. Consequently, h(B∧D ;C) = h(B)∩ h(D ;C) ⊆ {b}∩ (K \ {b}) = ∅.
We therefore have
h(A;(B ∧D ;C)) = h(A);h(B ∧D ;C) = {a∗} ;∅ = ∅. (β)
From (α) and (β) we get h(G) = h((A∧∼D);B)∪h(A;(B∧D ;C)) = ∅. The
inclusion {c} = h(F ) ⊆ h(G) = ∅ is false so F ≤ G is not true in Cm (K).
The contrapositive of what we have just proved is that if F ≤ G is true in
the complex algebra of a model structure K, then K satisfies (l-refl′).
As part of the proof of [4, Lemma 6.5] it is stated that there are CR∗-
model structures in which tagging fails. No example is given, but K3 can be
used.
18 Counterexample to a theorem of Kowalski
According to [14, Theorem 8.1], R is “complete with respect to square-
increasing, commutative, integral relation algebras.” However, R does not
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contain all the formulas true in this class of algebras. By Theorem 14, (41)
is not a theorem of R, but it is in T3 and is therefore is true in all semi-
associative relation algebras, including all square-increasing, commutative,
integral relation algebras. Thus (41) is a counterexample to [14, Theorem
8.1], which was obtained as an immediate consequence of [14, Theorem 7.1],
that every normal De Morgan monoid is embeddable in a square-increasing,
commutative, integral relation algebra. However, the complex algebra of K3
is a counterexample, since K3 fails to satisfy tagging, it but would have to
do so if Cm (K3) were embedded in a relation algebra. The difficulty seems to
arise in the proof of [14, Lemma 5.4(1)].
19 Formulas in T5 \ CT4
We present just two examples of formulas requiring five variables to prove.
The second one (73) is a consequence of a formula that expresses DesArgues
Theorem when A,B, · · · are points and A;B is the set of points on the line
passing through A and B. Mikula´s [30] proved that Tω is not finitely axiom-
atizable by constructing infinitely many more formulas requiring arbitrarily
large numbers of variables to prove.
Theorem 15. [25, Theorems 8.1, 8.2] If A,B,C,D,E, F,G ∈ Π, then the
following two formulæ are in T5, but not in CT4 if the predicates are distinct.
A ∧ (B ∧ C ;D);(E ∧ F ;G)→ (72)(
A ∧ (B ∧ (C ∧∼C);D);(E ∧ F ;G)
)
∨
(
A ∧ (B ∧ C ;D);(E ∧ F ;(G ∧ ∼G))
)
∨ C ;
(
(C ;A ∧D ;E);G ∧D ;F ∧ C ;(A;G ∧B ;F )
)
;G
A;B ∧ C ;D ∧E ;F → (73)(
(A ∧ ∼A);B ∧ C ;D ∧E ;F
)
∨
(
A;B ∧ C ;(D ∧ ∼D) ∧ E ;F
)
∨
(
A;B ∧ C ;D ∧ (E ∧ ∼E);F
)
∨
(
A;B ∧C ;D ∧ E ;(F ∧ ∼F )
)
∨ A;
(
A;C ∧B ;D ∧ (A;E ∧B ;F );(E ;C ∧ F ;D)
)
;D
Proof. By [25, Theorem 8.1], if A,B, . . . , G are binary relations then (72) and
(73) are binary relations that contain the identity relation. In both cases a
straightforward proof of this fact only refers to five objects. Two are assumed
to be in the relation denoted by the left-hand side, and there are three more
corresponding to the occurrences of ; in the left-hand side. The proof consists
of assembling facts expressed by the right-hand side from the assumptions
that five objects are related to each other by six or seven binary relations
in ways described by the left-hand side. The proofs are similar to, but more
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elaborate, than the proofs in Table 8 or Theorem 12. The Cut rule is not
needed. Thus (72) and (73) are in CT5.
To show (72) and (73) are not in CT4, let K4 = 〈K,R,
∗, 0〉, where K =
{0, a, b, c}, x∗ = x for every x ∈ K, and R is determined in Table 15 (or [25,
Table 6]). Then K4 is a KR-model structure in which both (72) and (73) fail
K4 =
; {1
,
} {a} {b} {c}
{1
,
} {1
,
} {a} {b} {c}
{a} {a} {1
,
, a, c} {b, c} {a, b}
{b} {b} {b, c} {1
,
, a, b} {a, c}
{c} {c} {a, b} {a, c} {1
,
, b, c}
Table 15 The smallest KR-model structure that invalidates (72) and (73).
if h : P → Cm (K4) is a homomorphism such that {a} = h(A) = h(B) =
h(E) = h(G), {c} = h(C) = h(F ), and {b} = h(D). Such homomorphisms
exist if the predicates are distinct.
The proof shows there are 3-predicate instances of (72) and (73) that fail
to be in CT4. There are only two other 4-element KR-model structures that
invalidate (72), but (73) is valid in both of them. There are 58 KR-model
structures with 5 elements that invalidate (72) and (73).
20 TR, a proper extension of CT4 and CR
∗
By Theorem 13, no formula implying commutativity occurs inCTω. To insure
that the extension TR of CT4 includes CR
∗, we add axioms expressing
commutativity and density. Let Ψ be the set of equations A ◦B ≖ B ◦A and
A ≤ A ◦A for all A,B ∈ Π+. Define TR by
TR = {A : Ψ ⊢× 1
,
≤ A, A ∈ Π+}. (TR-def)
By Theorem 10, for all A ∈ Π+,
A ∈ TR iff Ψ ⊢+4 ∀xG(xAx) iff Ψ ⊢
× 1
,
≤ A. (TR-char)
Thus TR is the set of formulas A which, interpreted in a set of dense relations
that commute under fusion, always denotes a relation containing the identity
relation, and this fact, expressed by the formula ∀xG(xAx), can be proved
in first-order logic restricted to four variables, or, equivalently, the equation
1
,
≤ A can be proved in equational logic from Tarski’s axioms (R1)–(R10)
plus two axioms asserting that all relations are dense and commute with each
other under relative multiplication. For example, Reductio (A→ ∼A)→ ∼A
and Contraction (A → (A → B)) → (A → B) are in CR∗ because of the
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postulate p3 (Raaa) on CR∗-model structures, and they are in TR because
of the axioms expressing density. On the other hand, (41) is in TR but not
CR∗ by Theorem 14, so TR is a proper extension of CR∗.
Theorem 16. The inclusion CR∗ ⊂ TR holds and is proper because (41) is
in TR but not CR∗.
21 KR, an extension of CT4
KR is the “superclassical” logic obtained by adding the postulate a∗ = a
to the definition of CR∗-model structure. Under the formulas-as-relations
interpretation, the equation A∗ ≖ A holds when A is a symmetric relation.
The proof of the following theorem boils down to the observation that the
class of atom structures of atomic symmetric dense integral relation algebras
coincides with the class of KR-model structures.
Theorem 17. Let Ψ ⊆ Σ× be the set of equations A∗ ≖ A and A ≤ A ◦ A,
where A ∈ Π+. Then for all A ∈ Π+,
A ∈ KR iff Ψ ⊢+4 ∀xG(xAx) iff Ψ ⊢
× 1
,
≤ A (KR-char)
Theorem 17 characterizes KR as those predicates A ∈ Π+ for which the
formula ∀xG(xAx) is 4-provable from the assumption that all relations are
symmetric and dense, or, equivalently, 1
,
≤ A is true in all symmetric dense
relation algebras, or, equivalently, 1
,
≤ A is deducible from the axioms (R1)–
(R10), A ≤ A;A, and A−1 = A. Since relation algebras are semi-simple and
simple symmetric relation algebras are commutative and integral (see the end
of §12), it suffices to check only symmetric dense relation algebras in which
1
,
is an atom when determining whether A is in KR.
By [21, Theorem 12] (or [24, Theorem 473]), the probability that a ran-
domly selected finite relation algebra with n atoms is integral and symmetric
approaches 100% as n→∞. Since symmetry implies commutativity, almost
every finite relation algebra is commutative. The probability of being dense
falls to zero, since one expects only about half of the atoms to be dense. In-
stead of choosing from all finite relation algebras, one may choose from just
the dense ones. A randomly selected finite dense relation algebra will almost
certainly be integral and symmetric, hence also commutative. Therefore the
atom structure of a randomly selected finite dense relation algebra is almost
certainly a KR-model structure. A slight reworking of the proof of [21, The-
orem 12] shows that the number of KR-model structures with n elements is
asymptotic to
κ(n) =
1
(n− 1)!
· 2
(n−1)(n−2)(n+3)
6 ,
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i.e., the ratio of κ(n) to the actual number approaches 1 as n → ∞. At
my first meeting with Alasdair Urquhart, in the late 1970s or a little later,
we discussed how easy it is to construct finite relation algebras and relevant
model structures.
For any finite dimension d ≥ 3 chosen in advance, a randomly selected fi-
nite dense relation algebra will almost certainly be in RAd, the variety whose
equational theory consists of all equations that are d-provable (see §11). Ev-
ery finite subset of the equational theory of RRA is included in the equational
theory of RAd for some finite d ≥ 3. Therefore, for any finite set of equations
that are true in all representable relation algebras, a randomly selected finite
dense relation algebra will almost certainly satisfy all of them [21, Theo-
rem 15], as well as be symmetric, integral, and commutative. This suggests
(but does not prove) that almost every finite dense relation algebra is repre-
sentable.
22 RM, an extension of T4
Interpreting formulas as relations leads naturally to classifying formulas ac-
cording to what they say about relations. Some formulas express logical laws,
such as A→ A, which asserts that the relation A is a subset of itself. Other
formulas amount to non-logical assumptions, i.e., assumptions about rela-
tions that may not be universally true. For example, A→ A ◦A holds when
A is dense. By expressing fusion ◦ with negation ∼ and implication → and
taking the contrapositive we get Reductio (A→ ∼A)→ ∼A, another formula
that says A is dense.
When we defined TR, we adopted non-logical assumptions of commuta-
tivy and density and restricted the logical apparatus to four variables. The
resulting logic contains all of classical relevant logic CR∗, and actually ex-
cedes it by one formula (41) and one postulate (l-refl′). This difference is
eliminated in KR, the result of adding a∗ = a to CR∗ or adding A∗ ≖ A to
TR. The key feature is the restriction to four variables. Thus TR has non-
logical assumptions of commutativity and density, while KR has non-logical
assumptions of symmetry and density, but in both cases we restrict the log-
ical apparatus to four variables. This restriction is required to characterize
KR because by Theorem 15 there are 5-provable formulas that are not in
KR.
No such restriction is needed for RM, the Dunn-McColl logic R-mingle,
obtained by adding the mingle axiom A → (A → A) to R. Under the
formulas-as-relations interpretation, A → (A → A) is valid if and only if
A is transitive. The connectives of RM are ∧, ∨, →, and ∼, the non-logical
assumptions are commutativity, density, and transitivity, and the logical ap-
paratus is not restricted. There are infinitely many variables available to prove
consequences of the non-logical assumptions. Meyer [1, p. 413, Corollary 3.1]
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proved that the finite normal Sugihara lattices are characteristic for RM. By
[25, Theorem 6.2(i)], every finite normal Sugihara lattice is isomorphic to an
algebra whose universe is a set K of transitive dense binary relations on a
set U , such that K is closed under the operations ∧, ∨, →, and ∼ in Table 1,
and K is commutative under fusion. This completeness and representability
of normal Sugihara lattices has the following consequence.
Theorem 18. Let Ψ ⊆ Σ× be the set of equations A ◦ B ≖ B ◦ A and
A ≖ A ◦A where A,B ∈ Πr. Then for all A ∈ Πr,
A ∈ RM iff Ψ ⊢+ ∀xG(xAx) iff Ψ ⊢
× 1
,
≤ A. (RM-char)
Theorem 18 is restricted toΠr to exclude 1
,
;1
,
≖ 1
,
from Ψ . Otherwise, Ψ ⊢×
A ≤ 1
,
for every A ∈ Π+, since 1
,
;1
,
≖ 1
,
⊢× 1
,
+ 1
,
≖ 1
,
. The consequences
of Ψ would include all of classical propositional logic, as was observed in [4,
Lemma 2.3, Theorem 5.8]. On [4, p. 122] there is a computation intended to
show that Sugihara lattices cannot be represented with binary relations with
operations from Table 1. If correct, it would have ruled out Theorem 18, but
it ends at {[i) : i ≤ −2}, which should have been {[i) : i ≥ −2}. Furthermore,
[4, Lemma 5.6(2)(3)] is a claim about atoms that happens to be false but is
proved for elements. It would also have precluded Theorem 18.
23 Conclusion and questions
Starting with →, the vocabulary of relevance logic grew until, in the classical
relevant logic of Meyer and Routley, it was the same as the relation alge-
bras of Tarski. Meyer and Routley stopped one formula and one property
short of Tarski, by missing (41) and (l-refl′). Meyer and Routley included
commutativity and density for good historical and logical reasons, but Tarski
had no reason to restrict his axiomatization of the calculus of relations to
those that are dense and commute under composition. The definition of TR
takes both steps. TR contains everything 4-provable, including a 3-provable
formula missing from CR∗, plus everything true in all commutative dense
relation algebras. When formulas are interpreted as relations, both the logic
TR and the equational theory of commutative dense relation algebras may
be characterized as whatever is 4-provable from commutativity and density.
Similarly, KR and the equational theory of symmetric dense relation alge-
bras are characterized as whatever is 4-provable from symmetry and density.
Finally, RM and the equational theory of sets of transitive dense relations,
closed under ∧, ∨, →, and ∼ from Table 1 and commuting under ◦, are char-
acterized as everything in the relevant vocabulary that is ω-provable from
transitivity, density, and commutativity.
In the case of TR and KR, there are two increasing chains of exten-
sions obtained by allowing more variables, i.e., by relaxing the restrictions
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on the logical apparatus while retaining the non-logical assumptions. The
chains approach CTΨω , where Ψ is the set of non-logical assumptions, either
commutativity and density in the case of TR, or symmetry and density for
KR. RM already contains CTω. These extensions are significant because if
a model structure K validates CTω then it has a complex algebra that is a
simple representable relation algebra and therefore can be embedded in the
complex algebra of the model structure U of pairs on some set U (see §12),
with the advantage that the ternary relation of U is (triples) and its Routley
star is (star). Although (72) and (73) can fail to be valid in the atom struc-
ture of a non-representable relation algebra, such as the one in Table 15, they
are valid in every model structure of pairs and are in CTω (in fact, CT5),
so a randomly selected dense relation algebra will almost certainly have an
atom structure in which (72) and (73) are valid. They are not always valid,
but almost always.
In all this, the target is U, the model structure of pairs on U . Although U
may have never been mentioned in any of their works, one could fairly say
that De Morgan, Peirce, Schro¨der, and Tarski were studying and axiomatizing
some of its properties, and that Routley and Meyer were axiomatizing U
directly, through various choices of postulates for relevant model structures.
In any case, U lurks in the background—any randomly chosen finite relevant
model structure is almost certain to have any particular equational property
of U fixed in advance.
Perhaps U would be a good example of a relevant model structure, for in
the theory of relation algebras, its complex algebra Re(U) is the prototypical
example. One advantage is that if worlds are pairs and R is determined by
(triples) or something similar, then R need not be explicitly mentioned in the
truth condition. For example, [26] says,
“Like the semantics of modal logic, the semantics of relevance logic relativises truth
of formulæ to worlds. But Routley and Meyer go modal logic one better and use a
three-place relation on worlds. . . . Their truth condition for A→ B on this semantics
is the following:
A → B is true at a world a if and only if for all worlds b and c such that Rabc (R
is the accessibility relation) either A is false at b or B is true at c.
For people new to the field it takes some time to get used to this truth condition.”
If worlds are pairs ab and R is the set of triples of the form (ab, ca, cb), then
the truth condition becomes
A→ B is true at a world ab if and only if for all worlds ca and cb, either A is false
at ca or B is true at cb.
This truth condition on pairs validates all the axioms of R that do not need
density or commutativity. The real worlds are the identity pairs aa, while
the possible worlds (where A∧∼A can hold) are the diversity pairs ab with
a 6= b.
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1. Does the conception of worlds (set-ups, situations, states, cases, trips, acts,
plays, events, etc) as pairs explain or clarify any philosophical or logical
phenomena?
2. “Will the real negation please stand up?” [2, p. 174]. Does Table 1 show
which negation is “real”?
3. What is the logical significance of (41)? Would it be proposed as an axiom
for a relevance logic? Why was it never previously considered?
4. Can an axiomatization of TR be obtained by adding (41) to an axioma-
tization of CR∗?
5. Can an axiomatization of CR∗ be obtained by deleting axiom (R9) from
the axioms for L×?
6. Which subsets of (1)–(71) axiomatize T3, T4, CT3, CT4, and CR
∗?
7. Which of the derived rules of CT3 listed in Theorem 11 are either deriv-
able, admissible, or included by definition in R or CR∗? For example, the
first two 1-provable rules are included in R by definition, and the third is
admissible. What about all the others?
8. Are there any deductive rules of CT4 that require four variables?
9. Is almost every finite relation algebra representable?
10. Does the fact that a randomly selected CR∗-model structure satisfying
tagging will almost certainly be symmetric and satisfy any particular fi-
nite set of equations true in every representable relation algebra have any
philosophical implications?
11. Why do relevance logic and relation algebra overlap in spite of arising
independently through the pursuit of completely different goals?
12. Why did of Schro¨der’s studies and Tarski’s axiomatization stay within the
confines of the 4-variable fragment of the calculus of relations?
13. Why did relevance logic develop within the 4-variable fragment of the
calculus of relations? Why was one formula and one property of the 4-
variable fragment missed? Why was the focus on density, commutativity,
symmetry, transitivity, and no other non-logical postulates on relations?
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